Health Maintenance
Organizations Gem Health Association &dquo;Financial Woes Cited as Idaho HMO Closes,&dquo; American Medical News 23:12 January 25, 1980 The financially troubled Gem Health Assn. Inc. - the first functioning Health Maintenance Organization in Idaho certified by both the state and the Dept. of Health, Education, and Welfarehas gone out of business.
Gem Health, a group practice HMO with some 6,000 subscribers, had &dquo;cash flow problems&dquo; last year, according to Rex Lane, chief examiner of the state insurance department. Lane said that HEW had refused Gem's loan request and that the state was unable to return the HMO to a solid financial standing.
According to Lane, some two-thirds of the HMO members -a group of state employes -withdrew from Gem last year after hearing that the group had financial problems. The state insurance department was unable to get a court order prohibiting the group from withdrawing. &dquo;With two-thirds of the members gone, it was impossible to rehabilitate Gem,&dquo; Lane said. State and federal agencies began investigating the firm's finances last year when it was disclosed that the corporation had an estimated 1978 deficit of between $528,000 and $1.3 million. The corporation's board of trustees blamed most of its troubles on Smith, its $100,000a-year president since 1973, and on Dr. William lVlays, its $100,000-ayear board chairman.* Smith resigned earlier this month in exchange for a $150,000 lump settlement.
The action was based on a report by board members accusing Smith and Mays of poor judgment, extravagant administrative expenditures, employment policies based on &dquo;whim and caprice,&dquo; and the misappropriation of tens of thousands of dollars for their own use. Barrow, Aldridge & Co. assisted the board in the examination of the firm's ledgers. But the suit, filed through attorney Edward F. Bell, accuses the accounting firm of negligence and defamation of character.
A spokesman for 8,Michigan HMO of Detroit said ... that there was an agreement between Smith and the HMO, in which Smith agreed not to sue the health organization or any of its members. The spokesman said the accounting firm was supposed to be immune from suit by Smith under that agreement.... Rochester HMOs , &dquo;Lack of Hospitalization Controls Key to One IPA's Failure,&dquo; Group Health News 21:2 January 1980 oJ _ A dramatic success in enrolling General Motors employees quickly ended up as a key cause for the failure of a Rochester, New York, individual practice HMO in the mid-1970s, according to a research paper scheduled for publication this month in the Group Health Journal. The failure followed intense competition from two group model HMOs, both of which were able to control the unusually high hospitalization rates of GM workers.
Health Watch, an IPA sponsored by the local county medical society in 1973 to compete with two group model HMOs about to be offered to area employers, had 650 physicians signed up to provide services when it opened. All of the physicians were paid on a fee-forservice basis, and the IPA had a relatively high hospitalization rate in its first year -almost 800 days per 1,000 members per year. By the time it failed, two-thirds of Health Watch's members were GM employees who played a major part in raising the IPA's hospitalization rates to almost 50 percent higher than that of the local Blue Cross indemnity plan in 1975. The results were disastrous, and the plan was dissolved.
In contrast, the competing prepaid group practice, Genesee Valley Group Health Association, was able to achieve an overall 24 percent decrease in its hospitalization rates during the same period, having by 1975 inpatient rates 45 percent lower than the local Blue Cross plan. Genesee Valley also had a substantial number of GM employees enrolled, although fewer than the IPA.
The significance of the inpatient research is that it tracks GM employees both before and after they enrolled in the Rochester HMOs. Thus, a ... cohort analysis was made which enabled the researchers to make a direct comparison between the ability of various types of HJB10s to control hospitalization rates of comparable populations. This technique -a relatively rare set of controls over the many variables in research on the causes of hospitalization reduction in HlB10sallowed the researchers to separate the differences among the GM employees that could have affected their hospitalization rates. The result, say the authors, is to be able to directly attribute the differences among the HMOs' hospitalization rates to administrative or organizational factors.
The study's authors have a long history of HNIO analysis and have previously published other summaries of their cohort findings about the Rochester HlB10s.... The authors were provided access to all of the Blue Cross contract files from 1972 through 1975, which was the primary source of their utilization data. (Blue Cross handled the marketing of all three of the prepaid plans in the area when they first opened and is the primary sponsor of the only area prepaid group practice.)
The authors claim in their paper that Rochester provides an ideal setting in which to study the performance of HMOs. During the mid-1970s, the period of the cohort analysis, all of the prepaid plans had equal access to hospital beds. The physicians in the HMOs at first all served a variety of prepaid, fee-for-service and Medicaid patients and were for the most part unaware of what coverage their patients had.
Two of the three HMOs had salaried physicians and the third, the IPA, did not place its physicians at risk for hospitalization. Thus, there were relatively few, if any, financial incentives affecting the physicians' decision to hospitalize HMO patients. And, because the HMOs were started and marketed simultaneously, the authors expected little effect of preventive care on their hospitalization findings.
The researchers were able to control for age differences statistically and the use of a single employer, General Motors, provided a control for variants in social and economic background which could also have affected hospitalization rates. The unique part of the study was the control over health status prior to HMO enrollment, potentially a large variable affecting HMO performance. Hospitalization rates for GM members before they enrolled in the HMOs were used to control for possible selective enrollment in the HlB10s, thereby eliminating a major variable in the explanation of the HMOs' performances.
When initially marketed, the three area HMOs provided comparable rates and benefits which did not substantially change for the first two years. But by the third year, the IPA's experience of high hospitalization caused its premiums to rise dramatically and by the fourth year resulted in its failure. By 1975, the IPA's premiums had increased by 61 percent over 1973 levels, compared to increases of only 15 percent t for the prepaid group practice and 19 percent for Blue Cross. The other HMOa multisite group practice, the Rochester Health Networkhad premium increases of only 18 percent in the same period.
Marketing to General Motors employees was particularly competitive for all three HMOs and Blue Cross from 1972 to 1975, since Blue Cross experience-rated GM due to the high hospitalization rates of its employees. (The Rochester Blue Cross plan community-rated all other employers.) GM also provided its employees with a broader set of covered benefits than did other employers so that the HMOs' premiums were close to those of Blue Cross. Thus, G:M employees could gain the broader HMO benefits without any additional copayments. As a result, GM had the highest HMO enrollment of any Rochester employer during the study period. In addition, enrollment in the IPA was the greatest among the HMOs.
Between 1972 and 1975, the inpatient rate for Blue Cross subscribers increased by only 3 percent, but the combined rates for the three ffi10s increased by 18 percent. The GM enrollees in the HMOs also experienced increases in their inpatient days by about 17 percent.
But the IPA accounted for most of the increase, since the prepaid group practice was able to significantly reduce the rates of its GlB1 members.
The researchers found that the hospitalization rate changes of the GM employees enrolled in the HMOs were for the most part not directly a result of the HMOs' increased benefits. The GM HMO members were as a whole several years younger than the Blue Crosscovered workers, although the IPA's GM members were slightly older than either the network or prepaid group practice's GM members.
However, the researchers compensated for these differences in their analysis.
The principal finding of the study was that faced with an attractive alternative to their current health benefits packages, GM employees joined the Rochester HMOs in significant numbers. But because of its inability to reduce hospitalizations the IPA failed, while the other two HMOsthe prepaid group practice in particularwere able to manage the hospitalizations and were thus able to survive their relatively difficult early years of development....
